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ABSTRACT 
This article considers the terrorism financing risk associated with the growth of Financial 
Technology (FinTech) innovations and in particular, focuses on virtual currency (VC) products 
and services. The ease with which cross-border payments by virtual currencies are facilitated, 
the anonymity surrounding their usage and their potential to be converted into the fiat financial 
system, make them ideal for terrorism financing and therefore calls for a coordinated global 
regulatory response. This article considers the extent of the risk of terrorism financing through 
virtual currencies in ‘high risk’ States by focusing on countries that have been recently 
associated with terrorism activities. It assesses the robustness of their financial regulatory and 
law enforcement regimes in combating terrorism financing and considers the extent to which 
Regulatory Technology (RegTech) and its global standardisation, can mitigate this risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The growth in Financial Technology (FinTech) innovations and New Payment Products and 
Services (NPPS) is very welcomed as it brings numerous benefits both to businesses and 
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 consumers. These products and services which include: prepaid cards, e-payments, mobile 
banking, mobile payment services, internet-based payment services and virtual currencies, are 
also associated with a myriad of challenges. The cross-border nature of the operation of these 
products and services call for international cooperation in the approach to be taken for their 
regulation. This article focuses on the potential risk of terrorism financing through virtual 
currencies which threatens the ground already gained in combating terrorism financing through 
the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Money laundering and terrorism 
financing have generally been associated with jurisdictions with weak financial regulatory and 
law enforcement regimes. However, with the introduction of speedy but much more 
technologically complex payment methods such as virtual currencies - operating across 
jurisdictions with varying approaches to regulating internet / cyber-based transactions - the risk 
of terrorism financing has become even greater. This article considers the extent to which 
Regulatory Technology (RegTech) and its global standardisation can mitigate this risk.  
 
It is divided into five sections: section one provides a brief historical context of recent 
terrorism financing; section two considers the nature and operation of virtual currencies; 
section three assesses the limitations of the risk-based approach of the FATF Anti-Money 
Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) provisions and the effect 
of these on transactions involving virtual currencies and virtual currency exchanges; section 
four provides a case study of countries that have recently been linked with terrorism, assessing 
the extent to which their financial regulatory framework and law enforcement mechanisms are 
able to effectively mitigate potential risks of terrorism financing through virtual currencies. It 
also considers the extent to which the RegTech solutions can be applied in these states to 
enhance both financial regulation and law enforcements against terrorism financing using VC. 
Section five considers the need for international cooperation and the extent to which a possible 
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 global standardisation of RegTech solutions to combat terrorism financing through virtual 
currencies, can succeed. 
 
 
TERRORISM FINANCING – HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
All terrorism acts require some form of financing. From large scale, coordinated terrorist 
attacks such as the 11 September 2001 attacks in US, to a one-man planned attack such as was 
carried out by Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo, in Norway in July 2011. 
 
In the case of the 11 September attacks, the nineteen terrorist hijackers had opened bank 
accounts, established inter-connected drawing rights, and received several international money 
transfers. Their activities characterised their lack of concern for the ability of the authorities to 
trace their financial transactions. Fortunately, the scrutiny by the formal banking sector and the 
introduction of international standards on anti-money laundering and combating the financing 
of terrorism (AML/CFT) and the implementation of these regionally and nationally, have 
resulted in a curtailment in the financing these types of activities. Due to regulations around 
financial institutions' responsibility to know their customers, the organisation of a terrorist 
activity, financed through the formal banking sector is increasingly difficult and are more than 
likely to be flagged up by banks and financial institutions when suspicious activities are carried 
out.  
 
With this increased scrutiny on the formal banking sector, the case of Anders Behring 
Breivik, who raised money largely through credit card borrowing1, is an indication that terrorist 
attacks would seek more secretive mechanisms for financing their activities.  
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 Despite the curtailment of terrorism financing in the formal financial sector, the rise 
and growth of New Payment Products and Services (NPPS) and, in particular, virtual 
currencies, presents a new challenge in this fight against the terrorism financing, thus 
challenging the progress that has been made thus far. This is so as the characteristics of virtual 
currencies and the degree of anonymity surrounding transactions settled through them, creates 
the possibility that the financing of terrorism through them can be widespread and go unnoticed 
by regulatory authorities.  
 
The well-known case that drives this point home is the recent Liberty Reserve. This 
case illustrates the potential that virtual currencies have in facilitating money laundering and 
therefore, also, terrorism financing. Federal law enforcement charged Liberty Reserve, a digital 
currency provider, with running a $6 billion digital money-laundering scheme. Prosecutors 
called it possibly the biggest money-laundering case in US history. Liberty Reserve, a 
centralized digital currency service based in San José Costa Rica, was similar in function to 
PayPal, it allowed users to register and transfer money to other users with only a name, e-mail 
address, and birth date. No efforts were made by the site to verify identities of its users, which 
attracted much illegal activity. Users had a traditional bank from which they wire money to a 
third-party exchanger, which were usually unlicensed money-transmitting businesses without 
significant government oversight or regulation. The exchanger then converted the money to 
digital currency, untraceable from its original source. That digital currency was then deposited 
into a Liberty Reserve account. No limits were placed on transaction sizes. Liberty Reserve 
charged 1% service fee on each transfer and offered shopping cart functionality. All the 
transactions were 100% irrevocable.  
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 Liberty Reserve was, in effect, a bank that issued its own digital currency. The key to 
Liberty’s system was that it never actually received deposits, but instead used a series of 
middlemen, or money exchangers, who bought the currency in bulk and then sold smaller 
portions to people looking to convert money into the digital currency. Their website was shut-
down by the US in May 2013.  
 
Another well-known case is the Silk road case where payment for criminal activities, 
by virtual currencies (in this case bitcoin) facilitated through the 'dark web' was widespread 
and went unnoticed by the authorities. The cite which was launched in February 2011 was shut 
down in October 2011. 
 
What further necessitates this article is the increasing need of terrorists to hide their 
identity from the formal financial sector and therefore their quest for payment mechanisms that 
facilitate anonymous transactions such as is characterised by New Payment Products and 
Services (NPPS). This explains why the Paris attacks of November 2015 were financed largely 
using prepaid cards, which are a class of NPPS. As such, if a coordinated global regime for 
regulating the use of VC is not instituted, there is a high likelihood of the widespread use of 
these currencies to finance terrorist activities. 
 
 
THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
Virtual currencies can be defined as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally 
traded and functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a 
store of value, but does not have legal tender status… in any jurisdiction”.2 Virtual currencies 
can be explained as digital objects that hold economic value and are functionally similar to fiat 
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 currencies (which are issued by governments), however they are not issued in the way that fiat 
currencies are but are instead created on the basis of private agreement among users and their 
operation is governed by this agreement. 
 
There are two main characteristics of virtual currencies. They can be centralised or 
decentralised. Centralised virtual currencies have a central administering authority that controls 
the system. This administrating authority issues the currency; establishes the rules for its use; 
maintains a central payment ledger; and has authority to withdraw it from circulation. The 
exchange rate for a convertible virtual currency may be floating or fixed. It is floating when it 
is determined by market supply and demand for the virtual currency and it is fixed when it is 
pegged by the administrator at a set value measured in fiat currency or another real-world store 
of value, such as gold or a basket of currencies. Most virtual currency payments transactions 
involve centralised virtual currencies, such as the now defunct Liberty Reserve dollars/euros 
used by Liberty Reserve, discussed above. Others include: Second Life “Linden dollars” and 
World of Warcraft gold. 3  
 
Decentralised virtual currencies (meaning that they are issued without a central 
administering authority) are cryptography-based and are distributed, open source, and function 
on a peer-to-peer basis.4 They are also known as crypto-currencies. Crypto-currencies are by 
definition convertible virtual currencies, meaning that they have an equivalent value in real fiat 
currency, and can be exchanged for such fiat currency.  
 
The characteristic of virtual currencies which include their convertibility to fiat 
currency and ability to be used as a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value, 
all facilitate their usage as a currency and as a peer-to-peer payments mechanism for settling 
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 commercial transactions. The acceptance of cryptocurrencies as payment method is becoming 
widespread in the advanced markets and Bitcoin - which was the first cryptocurrency to gain 
international reputation as a currency acceptable to settle transactions and which is the most 
widely used cryptocurrency - is now an acceptable form of payment by a good number of well-
known merchants in exchange for goods and services. Examples of well-known merchants 
accepting this crypto currency include: Amazon, eBay, Expedia, Victoria Secrets and Subway. 
 
 
Factors Making Virtual Currencies a Viable Approach for Terrorism Financing 
The storing and mobilisation of finance raised by terrorists is also critical in determining their 
ability to carry out acts of terrorism. As these would necessarily involve people and transactions 
outside the terrorists' immediate network and be significantly conducted through the formal 
financial sector, they are therefore beyond their control. 
 
Hence, as the financing of terrorism activities have become more visible in the formal 
financial sector and to law enforcement agencies, terrorists have increasingly had to look for 
alternative to methods of raising finance and have turned mainly to criminal activity. They have 
been known to raise finance through: kidnapping for ransom as done by al-Qaeda and Boko 
Haram in Nigeria; Boko Haram have also financed terrorism through robbing banks and 
hijacking cars. Al-Qaeda, in Iraq, also raises money through kidnapping and robbing of 
jewellery stores. Al-Shabaab, in Somalia, raises money, amongst other ways, through mounting 
'tolls' on roads under its control.  
 
As stated above, anti-money laundering regulation governing banks and the resulting 
clampdown on terrorism financing through the formal sector, have made it more difficult for 
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 terrorists to raise money. They are thus, likely to see virtual currencies as an easier alternative 
for financing their activities if able to access this platform. Two characteristics that make virtual 
currencies attractive for use by terrorists is their convertibility to fiat money and the anonymity 
surrounding their usage. 
 
In this vein, they are similar to ‘hawala’ transactions which is an ancient system of money 
transfer originating from South Asia and has also been used to finance terrorism. It works with 
a network of operators. An individual wishing to transfer funds would contact an operator at 
his location and pay a commission for money he wishes to transfer. The collector, at another 
location, contacts the local operator and collects the money less the commission. Its usage is 
now wide spread but purely based on trust. Like virtual currencies, it is an alternative 
remittance system, which works ideally outside the circle of banks and formal financial 
systems. However, unlike virtual currencies, transaction amounts are low and no-where near 
the scale moving through banks and potentially involving virtual currencies. In fact, when 
transaction amounts become large, operators eventually resort to banks to help them make 
transfers.5 Also, virtual currencies transactions are financial technology products and are also 
described as new payment products and services, which as seen in the case of liberty reserve 
can mean that goods and services may be obtained without physical cash, whereas ‘hawala’ 
transactions involve the receipt of cash/legal tender. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON AML/CFT AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
The FATF Risk-Based Approach to AML/CFT and Challenges 
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 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that 
develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money 
laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The FATF Recommendations set out a framework of measures that countries 
should implement in order to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, as well as the 
financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Recommendations constitutes 
international standards but are non-binding although countries are encouraged to implement 
them. 
 
The FATF risk based approach (RBA) to AML/CFT means that countries, competent 
authorities and financial institutions, are expected to identify, assess and understand the money 
laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risks to which they are exposed and take 
AML/CFT measures commensurate to those risks in order to mitigate them effectively. The 
FATF states that when assessing ML/TF risk, countries, competent authorities and financial 
institutions should analyse and seek to understand how the ML/TF risks they identify affect 
them; the risk assessment therefore provides the basis for the risk-sensitive application of 
AML/CFT measures.6 
 
The risk based approach was introduced in 2012, when the FATF updated its 
Recommendations to strengthen global safeguards and to further protect the integrity of the 
financial system by providing governments with stronger tools to take action against financial 
crime. 
 
One of the most important changes was the increased emphasis on the risk based 
approach to AML/CFT, especially in relation to preventive measures and supervision. The 
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 2012 recommendations were to strengthen the 2003 coverage of risk-based approach. While 
the 2003 recommendations provided for the application of the risk based approach in some 
areas, the 2012 Recommendations consider the risk based approach to be an ‘essential 
foundation’ of a country’s AML/CFT framework. This is a primary requirement applicable to 
all relevant FATF Recommendations. 
 
The Introduction to the 40 Recommendations, the risk based approach ‘allows 
countries, within the framework of the FATF requirements, to adopt a more flexible set of 
measures in order to target their resources more effectively and apply preventive measures that 
are commensurate to the nature of risks, in order to focus their efforts in the most effective 
way’.7 
 
From the Guidance for a risk based approach document8 itself, what is clear is that an 
effective risk based approach will depend on the soundness of financial institutions and the 
robustness of financial regulatory and law enforcement frameworks, since it is the financial 
institutions and regulatory and law enforcement authorities that are directly responsible for 
identifying, assessing and mitigating the AML/CFT risks identified. The main challenge, 
therefore to the risk based approach is the absence of robust legal and regulatory frameworks 
in countries, to support this approach which means that it is redundant to states both with weak 
banks and weak financial regulatory regimes, since these states are likely to be challenged with 
the inability of their banking sectors to effectively identify and assess their own ML/TF risks 
and therefore, will be unable to effectively mitigate them. The risk based approach is also 
redundant to these states as their legal systems would be unable to effectively enforce 
AML/CFT provisions, if at all discovered. 
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 Challenges of the FATF RBA with Specific Reference to Virtual Currencies 
This challenge of the absence of robust legal and financial regulatory regimes in a good number 
of countries is further exacerbated by the global nature of terrorism activities9 and, particularly, 
by the likelihood that countries with weaker legal regimes can be used as potential breeding 
grounds for terrorism financing and thus present a global challenge. Hence, the precise 
challenges to the risk based approach to ML/FT is that it does not have a global reach. Setting 
a global standard would be challenging due to the varying degree of financial and legal systems 
development across the world ranging from advanced, emerging, developing to 
underdeveloped financial and legal systems which enabled criminal activity in cases like the 
Liberty Reserve, where jurisdictions with weak regimes - such as Nigeria - were used to launder 
money for illicit purposes. Also, the inconsistent commitment to fighting terrorism across the 
world, linked with the weakness of the rule of law and law enforcement mechanisms in most 
vulnerable jurisdictions, further promotes the platform for terrorism financing through these 
countries and, therefore, making the attainment of a global reach even more difficult. 
 
The lack of a global reach of the risk-based approach to regulating money laundry and 
terrorism financing is further compounded by the possibility of the use of virtual currencies to 
finance terrorism activities. The technological complexities characterising the functionality of 
decentralised virtual currencies, as well as the anonymity underpinning both decentralised and 
centralised virtual currencies as payment mechanisms, in addition to ill-developed legal 
systems and financial regulatory regimes, all make the use of virtual currencies to finance 
terrorism activities challenging to control. The main problem here is that, whilst countries with 
sound legal and enforcement systems and robust financial regulatory regimes are more able to 
check the ML/FT risks of VC, countries with weaker institutions are less able to do so. As such, 
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 global efforts to check ML/FT through VC would only be as strong as the weakest link of 
nations, with weak financial regulatory regimes and poor law enforcement mechanisms. 
 
 
Assessing the critical risk transmitted through virtual currency exchangers 
One of the main risks associated with the use of virtual currencies is the possibility of their 
convertibility to fiat money (currency that is declared by a state’s government to be legal tender 
such as US dollars and pound sterling) and through this, intersect with the regulated fiat 
currency financial system – as was the case in Liberty Reserve.10 This can be done through 
convertible VC exchanges or exchangers. They can be a person or an entity engaged as a 
business in the exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other forms of virtual 
currency and also precious metals, and vice versa, for a fee (commission). Exchangers 
generally accept a wide range of payments, including cash, wires, credit cards, and other virtual 
currencies, and can be administrator-affiliated, non-affiliated, or a third-party provider. 
Exchangers can act as a bourse or as an exchange desk. Individuals typically use exchangers 
to deposit and withdraw money from virtual currency accounts.11 
 
As nodes enabling the intersection of virtual currencies with the fiat currency financial 
system, a careful examination of their operation and the devising of an international mechanism 
/ regime to regulate them is critical. 
 
 
Regulatory aspects for virtual currency exchanges/exchangers 
Virtual currency exchangers can also be referred to as providing Money or Value Transfer 
Services (MVTS) which “refers to financial services that involve the acceptance of cash, 
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 cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value and the payment of a 
corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary by means of a communication, 
message, transfer, or through a clearing network to which the MVTS provider belongs. 
Transactions performed by such services can involve one or more intermediaries and a final 
payment to a third party, and may include any new payment methods.”12 
 
Any persons or entities engaged in virtual currency exchange services can be used as a 
mechanism for money laundering and terrorism financing and as such, should be effectively 
regulated. For this, the FATF Recommendations are instructive. 
 
Regulation should ensure that the regulatory authorities are able to assess money 
laundering and terrorism financing risks of the operation of such entities to ensure that 
sufficient resources are allocated to mitigate such risks. This also includes that such entities 
and institutions should be able to identify, assess and mitigate the ML/TF risks arising from 
their operations.13 
 
Regulation should require that such entities fulfil customer due diligence (CDD) 
requirements and should know their customers and be able to verify their customer’s identity 
using reliable, independent source documents, data or information. The entities should also be 
able to identify the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify their identity, 
such that the entity is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, of the account holding 
the proceeds of the transaction. In fact, the FATF suggests that, in the light of the nature of 
Virtual Currency Payment Products and Services (VCPPS)14, in which customer relationships 
are established and transactions conducted entirely through the internet – such as VC 
exchangers - institutions must necessarily rely on non-face-to-face identification and 
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 verification. The FATF suggests that countries should consider requiring entities providing 
such services to follow the best practices suggested in the June 2013 New Payment Products 
and Services (NPPS) Guidance including: corroborating identity information received from the 
customer, such as a national identity number, with information in third party databases or other 
reliable sources; potentially tracing the customer’s Internet Protocol (IP) address; and searching 
the Web for corroborating activity information consistent with the customer’s transaction 
profile, provided that the data collection is in line with national privacy legislation.15 
 
Regulation should require virtual currency exchangers/exchanges to maintain records 
on transactions and information obtained through the CDD measures. For instance, FATF 
recommends that they should keep, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, 
both domestic and international. The CDD information and the transaction records should be 
available to domestic competent authorities.16 
 
Regulation should require VC exchange entities to be registered or licenced17 as 
providers of Money and Value Transfer Services (MVTS). Transactions performed by such 
services can involve one or more intermediaries and a final payment to a third party, and may 
include any new payment methods (as in payment in virtual currency).18 The registering of 
such entity should be done by a competent authority and subject to effective systems for 
monitoring and complying with AML/CFT provisions and domestic authorities should be able 
to identify such persons or entities carrying out virtual currency exchange services without a 
license or registration and apply appropriate sanctions. A typical example of an effective 
licensing and registration regime for such entities can be seen in the work of the US Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) which is a bureau of the United States Department of 
the Treasury that collects and analyses information about financial transactions in order to 
combat domestic and international money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial 
crimes. In May 2015, in coordination with federal law enforcement partners, FinCEN assessed 
the first civil monetary penalty against a virtual currency exchanger, Ripple Labs Inc., for 
failure to register with FinCEN as a money services business as well as its failure to implement 
and maintain an adequate AML program designed to protect its products from use by money 
launderers or terrorist financiers. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of such regulation would 
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 require the existence of a strong competent authority empowered both by the legal and 
regulatory framework within the state. As assessed below, this is a phenomenon lacking in 
most high-risk states.19 
 
Regulation should also require that financial groups providing, amongst other services, 
MVTS including VC exchanges, should ‘implement group-wide programmes against money 
laundering and terrorist financing, including policies and procedures for sharing information 
within the group for AML/CFT purposes.’20 These financial groups should be required to 
ensure that their foreign branches and majority- owned subsidiaries (which may include MVTS 
/ VC exchange services) apply AML/CFT measures consistent with the home country 
requirements - thus home countries should have robust enough financial regulatory standards 
to be able to monitor the operations of the groups and their subsidiaries conducting VC 
exchange services.  
 
Regulation should also require that virtual currency exchange services should maintain 
suspicious transaction reporting.21 This will require that if VC exchangers providing exchange 
services suspect that or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a 
criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, by law, to report 
promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligent unit. It is clear that the absence of such 
requirements greatly facilitated money laundering in the Liberty Reserve case. 
 
Thus, the effective application of a risk based approach to AML/CFT provisions 
focused on the operation of VC exchanges and similar entities worldwide, would require the 
existence of a robust financial regulatory regime and able competent authorities. This would 
include law enforcement agencies and financial intelligence units.  
 
Due to the cross-border nature of the operations of virtual currency exchanges, an 
effective global AML/CFT regime necessarily requires – as a first step - that all countries have 
robust financial regulatory and law enforcement regimes, so that money laundering and 
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 terrorism financing activities do not gravitate to and concentrate on regions and countries with 
weak law and regulatory regimes.  
 
Some of the current obstacles to applying some of the mitigating measures to VC 
exchange entities, as assessed above, is the weak financial regulatory regimes governing the 
global operation of VC exchanges in some jurisdictions, thus making such jurisdictions targets 
for money laundering and terrorism financing. As such, the application, for example, of FATF 
Recommendation 14 on registration or licensing requirements for Money and Value Transfer 
Services (MVTS) or VC exchange or exchangers is likely to be ineffective if the jurisdiction 
where the VC exchanger operates has a weak financial regulatory regime. 
 
Thus, the success of the risk-based approach to AML/CFT with respect to virtual 
currency exchanges is very much dependent on the strength of the domestic financial regulatory 
framework in states and the strengthen of the law enforcement regime to criminalise illicit 
activities and transactions - all of which will require the requisite use of technology 
commensurate with the technology behind these financial technology (FinTech) innovations 
themselves, which is well-known now as Regulatory technology (RegTech). RegTech is 
described by the UK Financial Conducts Authority “as the adoption of new technologies to 
facilitate the delivery of regulatory requirements…”22 to keep up with the increasingly dense 
data landscapes and the rapidly evolving FinTech sector, products and innovations. 
RegTech solutions within this context involves, inter alia, the use of big data analytics23 and 
artificial intelligence24 where regulators will be able to use required technology to aid the 
identification and monitory of risks posed by these institutions. Typical example of how this 
will be useful to virtual currency exchanges will be through their compliance with KYC /CDD 
(Know Your Customer/Customer Due Diligence). As their services are characterised by the 
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 provision of financial services over the internet, they hardly establish face to face contact with 
their customers, thus making compliance with KYC/CDD challenging. As such, to fulfil this 
arduous task would require the application of this type of technology – in other words RegTech. 
 
It also would necessitate that regulators are able to integrate RegTech solutions into 
their supervision and examination functions. A “RegTech for regulators” approach could help 
provide a multi-faceted solution to tackle regulatory complexity inherent in recent development 
of financial technology. By digitising the regulatory architecture, RegTech could also support 
a less burdensome approach to financial regulation as technology encourages transparency, 
addresses asymmetries and empowers consumers, market participants and regulators to better 
manage risk.  
 
Regulators have to be comfortable with the technological changes introduced by 
FinTech products. In the UK, actions already taken by the government to achieve its vision 
include the introduction of Project Innovate within the FCA and the resultant Innovation Hub 
and Regulatory Sandbox initiatives. This was achieved by the FCA inviting Innovate 
Finance25, which is an independent not-for-profit membership association representing the 
UK’s global FinTech community. The Sandbox is an initiative to provide FinTech innovators 
with support to navigate the regulatory system and promote competition in the interest of 
consumers. It aims to create a ‘safe space’ in which businesses can test innovative products, 
services, business models and delivery mechanisms in a live environment while ensuring that 
consumers are appropriately protected. 
 
Thus, two main areas of concern with respect to the risk based approach to money 
laundering and terrorism financing, especially with respect to the operation of VC exchanges 
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 are: (1) financial regulatory quality and the robustness of law enforcement regimes in countries 
and (2) the extent to which the regulators can speedily adopt RegTech solutions to monitor 
compliance with AML/CFT provisions and their ability to effectively standardise those 
RegTech solutions across the industry. 
 
Thus, although the risk-based approach to payments using virtual currencies examines 
how convertible virtual currency exchangers should, amongst other things, be subject to 
international AML/CFT standards26, efforts should also be channelled towards strengthening 
the regulatory framework in countries (along the lines of the UK FCA) and making their 
authorities more aware of the potential risk of VC exchangers. This would involve the adoption 
of the requisite RegTech, standardised to be able to address new financial regulatory issues 
arising from FinTech products and services, such as virtual currencies and virtual currency 
exchanges.  
 
 
Applying RegTech solutions to virtual currency exchanges and challenges 
It should be mentioned that with specific reference to decentralised virtual currencies, it is only 
recently that decentralised convertible VC technology allows certain risk mitigants to be built 
into decentralised Virtual Currency Payment Product and Services (VCPPS) in order to restrict 
functionality and reduce risk. For instance, multisignature (multi-sig) technology now enables 
VCPPS to effectively build in loading total wallet value, and value/velocity transaction limits 
into decentralised VCPPS. However, current decentralised VC technology does not make it 
possible to effectively build in geographic limits; limit use to the purchase of certain goods and 
services; or prevent person-to-person transfers.  
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 While technology may be able to build this in future, the concern for regulators should 
be the fact that these decentralised convertible VC technology / operators may decide not to 
build in these mitigants in order to maintain the anonymity functionalities of these platforms.27 
It would thus appear that, for now, the most practical way of inhibiting their ability to be 
converted to real asset is by restricting their entry into the fiat monetary system and this would 
be done primarily through the regulation of virtual currency exchangers. 
 
Suffice to mention that the adoption of RegTech by regulated financial institutions is 
also vital especially as they have been criticised of both the cost and time wasted on analysing 
data for the purposes of AML/CFT compliance. Most of their effort result in time and money 
spent chasing false-positive alerts of criminal or terrorist financing. These financial institutions 
therefore need to strengthen their own anti-money laundering (AML) and know-your-customer 
(KYC) systems or renting in better ones by adopting RegTech solutions. Thus, by using the 
latest artificial intelligence and machine-learning tools, they can manage their compliance 
burdens with sharper focus and at lower cost. This can be used to build a comprehensive global 
data set of individuals and companies that represent a potential money laundering and terrorism 
financing threat.28 
 
 
CASE STUDIES ON FINANCIAL REGULATORY QUALITY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
This section examines the extent to which banks and financial institutions in ‘high-risk’ 
countries with weak legal and financial regulatory regimes are able to identify and mitigate 
risks associated with convertible VC exchanges operating within their jurisdiction or providing 
services to customers in their jurisdiction. 
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As institutions offering VC exchange services would typically be providing cross-
border financial services, mechanisms for monitoring their operation would be through 
effective financial regulation. The section also then considers the extent to which legal systems 
are or would be able to effectively prosecute acts of terrorism financing through the operation 
of VC exchanges or other MVTS, when discovered. The assessment of both financial 
regulatory quality and the quality of the legal system uses the World Governance Indicators 
(WGI), developed by the World Bank, which rank countries according to quality of governance 
by aggregating data from many available sources.29  
 
 The two main WGI indicators relevant for assessing the countries’ financial regulatory 
quality and strengthen of their law enforcement mechanisms are: Regulatory quality (RQ) and 
Rule of law (RL).30 
 
The countries that would be assessed in this case study are a select list of countries that 
have been associated with terrorism activities in recent times. Although they are not the only 
countries associated with terrorism activities internationally, they are referred to as ‘high-risk’ 
countries for the purposes of this article and include: Afghanistan, Kenya, Iraq, Nigeria, 
Somalia, Sudan and Syria. 
 
Going by the analysis above, the adoption of RegTech solutions in these countries is 
unlikely to be at the same pace as their counterparts in advanced markets. Of these seven ‘high-
risk’ countries, three of them (Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) have been identified by FATF as 
high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions.31 Even though Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan 
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 are not deemed as high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions, their financial regulatory quality 
all need strengthening.  
 
As of writing, the WGI32 are based on 340 variables produced by 32 different sources, 
including commercial information providers, surveys of firms and households, non-
governmental organizations and public sector organizations.33 These indicators have been used 
to assess the governance status of countries across the world. 
 
The composite measures of governance generated by the Model used by the WGI team 
are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard deviation of one, and 
running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
WGI also report the data in percentile rank term, ranging from 0 (lowest rank) to 100 (highest 
rank). As such, the two aggregate indicators are reported in two ways: (1) in their standard 
normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, and (2) in percentile rank terms from 0 
to 100, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes.34 
 
 
Regulatory Quality 
Regulatory quality (RQ) measures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. In the context under review, it would mean the ability of regulatory authorities 
to strike the ideal balance between ensuring that robust AML/CFT standards are in place, 
without stifling the developments of FinTech products and services - such as virtual currency 
and the operation of virtual currency exchanges - through overregulation.  
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  This would require, among other things, that the regulatory framework is robust enough 
to effectively implement CDD through KYC policies. Due to the critical role played by 
financial regulatory authorities in ensuring sound AML/CFT through financial institutions, the 
focus of the measurement of regulatory quality in these high-risk states, is significant. Strong 
regulatory quality indicates that terrorism financing activities through the operation of virtual 
currency exchanges and other MVTS in these jurisdictions, are likely to be spotted and acted 
upon. 
 
 The rankings of these ‘high risk’ states and the estimate of governance for this indicator 
(regulatory quality) is an indication, among other things, of the extent of the robustness of 
states’ financial system to check money laundering and terrorism financing through the 
operation of virtual currency exchanges within their territory. 
 
 In 2015 the country that ranked the highest for regulatory quality was Singapore at 
100,35 whilst its estimate of governance for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 
to 2.5 was 2.26,36 which indicates very strong governance performance for the quality of 
regulation in the country in general including financial regulation and indeed, the regulation 
and monitoring of ML/FT. Thus the IMF describes Singapore's financial regulation and 
supervision as "...among the best globally."37 Suffice to mention also that in 2015, Singapore 
ranked fourth place globally of the world’s leading FinTech hubs.38 As the country appears to 
have embraced FinTech, it is not surprising therefore that, much like the case in the UK, the 
regulatory framework for the development of this sector would be keen to adopt RegTech 
solutions to ensure safe operation of FinTech product and services including virtual currencies 
and virtual currency exchanges. 
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Afghanistan 
Far from the ranking in Singapore, Afghanistan, of the ‘high-risk’ countries under review in 
this article, for regulatory quality ranked 13.4639 in 2015, placing it as one of the poorest 
performing countries for regulatory quality in the world. Its estimate of governance for the 
observance of this indicator, on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, was -1.00.40 This is an indication of a 
significantly weak governance performance for this indicator and highlights, also, a weak 
framework for financial regulation and, therefore, a potential enabler of money laundering and 
terrorism financing through virtual currency exchange operations within the country. 
 
Kenya 
Kenya in 2015, ranked 43.2641 for regulatory quality of all the countries assessed which shows 
that by global ranking standards it ranked at the low end of average for regulatory quality but 
the highest ranking of the ‘high-risk’ countries under review in this article. Its estimate of 
governance for the observance of this indicator, on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, was -0.29.42 This is 
also closer to average and indicates a stronger regime for licensing virtual currency 
exchanges/exchangers and a stronger CDD/KYC framework and therefore a robust AML/CFT 
regime, in comparison to all the other countries under review in this article. This also indicates 
that regulators may be able to identify money laundering and terrorism financing activities 
through the operation of virtual currency exchange operations within Kenya. Nonetheless, quite 
a bit still needs to be done in strengthening the financial regulatory quality in this country. 
 
Nigeria 
Nigeria, of the ‘high-risk’ countries under review for regulatory quality ranked 21.63,43 ranking 
it as one of the countries in the last 30 ranking for regulatory quality across the world. Its 
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 estimate of governance for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 was -0.84,44 
which indicates a weak governance performance for this indicator and thus indicating that the 
quality of regulation in Nigeria is weak including the quality of the regulation of financial 
markets. This suggests the existence of weak policy formulation, implementation and 
enforcement of financial regulation. It is also not surprising that the third-party exchangers in 
the Liberty Reserve case who took and made payments and then credited and debited the 
Liberty Reserve account (thus allowing LR to avoid collecting any banking information on its 
clients and as such leaving no paper trail) tended to be unlicensed money-transmitting 
businesses without significant government oversight or regulation and whose services, 
amongst other jurisdictions, were concentrated in Nigeria. Nigeria, of course, was a conducive 
environment since its financial regulatory framework was weak to ensure that parties providing 
financial services through the third-party exchangers in the Liberty Reserve case, were 
effectively licensed to perform such activities. This, of course, would have ensured they were 
checked for effectively complying with CDD/KYC rules. 
 
Iraq 
Iraq, of the ‘high-risk’ countries under review, for regulatory quality ranked 8.65,45 placing it 
as one of the worst 10 performers world-wide for regulatory quality. Its estimate of governance 
for the observance of this indicator, on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, was -1.23.46 This is an indication 
of a quite weak governance performance for this indicator and again highlighting the potential 
for harboring unlicensed virtual currency exchangers or even if licensed, is likely to have a 
weak CDD/KYC framework. 
 
Sudan 
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 Sudan of the ‘high-risk’ countries under review for regulatory quality ranked 4.80,47 placing it 
as one of the worst 10 performers world-wide for regulatory quality. Its estimate of governance 
for the observance of this indicator, on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, was -1.5048 and is an indication 
of a quite weak governance performance for this indicator. This like the case of Iraq, again 
highlights a potential weakness in licensing the operation of virtual currency exchangers and 
would indicate a weak CDD/KYC framework even if such entities/persons providing such 
services were licensed.  
 
Syria 
Syria of the ‘high-risk’ countries under review for regulatory quality ranked 4.32,49 placing it 
as one of the worst 10 performers world-wide for regulatory quality. Its estimate of governance 
for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 is -1.63.50 This is an indication of 
a quite weak governance performance for this indicator and again highlights the potential 
weakness in licensing the operation of virtual currency exchangers and a weak CDD/KYC 
framework even if such entities/persons were licensed. 
 
Somalia 
Somalia of the ‘high-risk’ countries under review for regulatory quality ranked 0.96,51 placing 
it as one of the lowest ranking countries in the world for regulatory quality. Its estimate of 
governance for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 was -2.1452 and is an 
indication of a very weak governance performance for this indicator, again highlighting the 
potential for a weak framework for licensing the operation of virtual currency exchangers and 
CDD/KYC. 
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 Strength of Legal Enforcement / Rule of Law Regime 
Rule of law (RL) measures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
Thus, in the context under review, it would refer to the robustness of the criminal justice 
system in investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism financing when identified. Such a 
system would be capable of investigating and adjudicating criminal offenses speedily and 
effectively, while ensuring that the rights of both victims and the accused are effectively 
protected. The delivery of criminal justice should take into consideration the entire system, 
including the police, the lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and prison officers. 
 
Suffice to mention that applying traditional law enforcement to cases involving virtual 
currency payment products and services present numerous challenges due to the anonymity 
inherent in their operation. The anonymity of most transactions makes it difficult to determine 
the identities of the persons involved thus making the process of investigation and prosecutions 
challenging. The situation is particularly worst with respect to decentralised VC transactions, 
where no central administering authority can be consulted and the underlying protocols on 
which most decentralised VCPPS are currently based, do not require or provide identification 
and verification of participants. Moreover, the historical transactions records generated on the 
blockchain by the underlying protocols are not necessarily associated with real world identity.53 
This level of anonymity limits the blockchain’s usefulness for monitoring transactions and 
identifying suspicious activity, and presents a significant challenge to law enforcement’s ability 
to trace illicit proceeds that are laundered using decentralised convertible VC. Furthermore, 
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 law enforcement cannot target one central location or entity for investigative purposes. These 
challenges, therefore, undermine countries’ ability to utilise effective, dissuasive sanctions.  
 
Nonetheless within this current state of affairs two approaches can be adopted to 
facilitate investigation of illicit conduct such as money laundering and terrorism financing. 
First, it is possible for financial institutions (and virtual currency exchangers) to be required to 
maintain transaction records that include: information to identify the parties; the public keys, 
addresses or accounts involved; the nature and date of the transaction, and the amount 
transferred. The public information available on the blockchain provides a foundation for 
record keeping, provided institutions can adequately identify their customers. Countries should 
require institutions to be attentive to the type of suspicious activity they are in a position to 
detect. 
 
Secondly, since these virtual currencies are likely to be converted to fiat money, to have 
any real usable value, investigations can be focused around the operation of VC exchangers to 
check any unusual activities. Thus, the regulation of virtual currency exchanges, particularly 
regulation around their licensing or registration requirements; their application of customer 
identification/verification (at the point of exchange) and recordkeeping requirements, could 
provide a pathway enabling countries to better apply effective and dissuasive sanctions in the 
virtual currency context. 
 
Whichever approach is adopted, it is clear – as revealed in the Liberty Reserve case – 
that the strength of a country’s criminal justice system (a critical part being its law enforcement 
mechanism) places it in the right position to be able to, through investigations around the work 
of VC exchangers, discover, investigate and prosecute, where necessary, individuals using 
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 virtual currencies as a platform for money laundering and terrorism financing. It is not likely 
that countries with weak legal systems and enforcement regimes would be able take such 
actions. This explains why, of all the jurisdictions where Liberty Reserve operated across the 
globe, only a few where able to cooperate with the US in the investigation against Liberty 
Reserve. 
 
The strength of countries’ criminal justice system54 including, critically, the strength of 
its enforcement regimes, is therefore pivotal to this process. The ensuing paragraphs, as such 
considers the extent to which the rule of law, as manifested in the strength both of the criminal 
justice system and the strength of the law enforcement, exists in the ‘high-risk’ states. The 
score on the Rule of Law indicator of these high-risk states is an indication of the extent to 
which their enforcement regime would be able to effectively prosecute terrorism financing 
through virtual currencies. 
 
In 2015 the country that ranked the highest for rule of law was Norway at 98.55,55 
whilst its estimate of governance for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 
was 2.02.56 This shows very strong governance performance for rule of law in the country in 
general and is indicative of an effective criminal justice system that has a robust basis for 
effectively supporting the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses such as terrorism 
financing through virtual currencies and virtual currency exchanges. 
 
 
Afghanistan 
In 2015, Afghanistan ranked 2.4057 for rule of law of all the countries assessed, which shows 
that by global ranking standards, it ranks as one of the lowest for rule of law. Its estimate of 
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 governance for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 was -1.59.58 This is 
significantly less than the average, which is 0 and even bearing towards the higher end of worst 
performing, which is -2.5. This is a huge indication that the law enforcement system is quite 
weak, in comparison to the rest of the world and significantly lacks the fundamentals for an 
effective criminal justice system that would be able to effectively investigate and prosecute 
terrorism financing through virtual currencies and virtual currency exchanges. 
 
Kenya 
In 2015, Kenya ranked 36.5359 for rule of law of all the countries assessed, which showed that, 
by global ranking standards it ranked quite low for the rule of law, although the highest ranking 
of the high-risk countries reviewed in this article. Its estimate of governance for the observance 
of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 was -0.49.60 This is less than the average and indicates 
that the criminal justice system has inherent weaknesses, although in comparison to the high-
risk countries assessed in this article, this score is higher, thus indicating an inclination towards 
better criminal justice system that may be able to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism 
financing by individuals using virtual currencies through the operation of virtual currency 
exchanges. 
 
Iraq 
In 2015, Iraq ranked 3.8461 for rule of law of all the countries assessed, which shows that by 
global ranking standards it ranks as one of the lowest for rule of law. Its estimate of governance 
for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 was -1.45.62 This is significantly 
less than the average, which is 0 and even bearing towards the higher end of worst performing 
which is -2.5 and is a huge indication that the criminal justice system is quite weak in 
comparison to the rest of the world and significantly lacks the fundamentals for an effective 
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 criminal justice system that would, someday, be able to effectively investigate and prosecute 
terrorism financing of individuals using virtual currencies through the operation of virtual 
currency exchanges. 
 
Nigeria 
In 2015, Nigeria ranked 12.9863 for rule of law of all the countries assessed, which shows that 
by global ranking standards it is one of the lowest performing 15 countries for rule of law in 
the world. Its estimate of governance for the observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 
2.5 was -1.04.64 This is significantly less than the average, which is 0 and a big indication that 
the criminal justice system is quite weak in comparison to the rest of the world and also lacks 
the fundamentals that form the basis for an effective criminal justice system that would be able 
to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism financing by individuals using virtual 
currencies through the operation of virtual currency exchanges. 
 
Somalia 
In 2015, Somalia ranked 065 for rule of law, of all the countries assessed, which shows that by 
global ranking standards it is was the worst performing country for rule of law in the world. It 
is not surprising that its estimate of governance for the observance of this indicator on a scale 
of -2.5 to 2.5 is -2.33,66 almost hitting the -2.5 worst performance limit. This is indicative that 
it lacks a criminal justice system and therefore lacks the fundamentals to effectively investigate 
any form of crime, how much more, investigating and prosecuting terrorism financing by 
virtual currencies someday. It would first need to build a criminal justice system before it can 
think of prosecuting the criminal activities that utilize such advanced technologies as virtual 
currencies, whose operation - as seen above - is heavily based on disguised identities and 
anonymity. 
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Sudan 
In 2015, Sudan ranked 8.1767 for rule of law of all the countries assessed, which places it as 
one of the worst 10 performers world-wide for rule of law. Its estimate of governance for the 
observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 was -1.18.68 This is significantly less than 
the average, which is 0 and an indication that the criminal justice system is quite weak in 
comparison to the rest of the world and significantly lacks the fundamentals for an effective 
criminal justice system that would be able to, someday, effectively investigate and prosecute 
terrorism financing through virtual currencies and virtual currency exchanges. 
 
Syria 
In 2015, Syria ranked 4.3269 for rule of law of all the countries assessed, which places it as one 
of the lowest ranking countries for rule of law world-wide. Its estimate of governance for the 
observance of this indicator on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 was -1.43.70 This is significantly less than 
the average, which is 0 and even bearing towards the higher end of worst performing which is 
-2.5, and is a huge indication that the criminal justice system is quite weak in comparison to 
the rest of the world and like the stats for Iraq, significantly lacks the basis for an effective 
criminal justice system that would be able to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism 
financing by virtual currencies and through currency exchanges, someday. 
 
On the basis of the analysis of the strength of the financial regulatory regimes and law 
enforcement regimes through the assessments of perceptions of regulatory quality and the rule 
of law, it appears all the countries are quite weak. Apart from Kenya, they all significantly lack 
the rudiments for building regimes both for effectively regulating financial institutions (such 
as virtual currency exchanges) transacting in virtual currencies, as well as investigating and 
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 prosecuting terrorism financing by virtual currencies (through virtual currency exchanges). The 
countries could, as such, continue to be breeding grounds / hideouts for terrorism financing in 
their current state of affairs.  
 
 
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND GLOBAL 
STANDARDISATION OF REGTECH SOLUTIONS 
The ease with which FinTech innovations - as is seen in the operation of virtual currencies – 
can be used to facilitate cross-border payment and therefore used to facilitate the financing of 
illicit activities such as acts of terrorism, calls for international cooperation. Due to the cross-
border nature of transactions involving virtual currencies, no single jurisdiction can boast of a 
robust regulatory / law enforcement regime for virtual currency transactions and virtual 
currency exchanges on its own. The strength of criminal justice and law enforcement systems 
varies across jurisdictions and where virtual currencies are used to facilitate crime, criminal 
activity in one territory can go without detection or punishment because they cannot be 
effectively investigated or enforced by persons outside the jurisdiction. This thus calls for 
coordination and cooperation among regulators and law enforcement authorities to address 
these issues. The importance of such cooperation is underscored by the case of the Liberty 
Reserve (and Silk road) where illegal transactions were conducted cross-border and went 
undetected by authorities and law enforcement agencies. The operation, therefore, of virtual 
currencies necessitates that the regulatory space should have, among other things, an extra-
territorial reach. 
 
The main challenge of having an extra-territorial reach for the operation of virtual 
currencies or indeed any internet-related transaction, is that international cooperation on such 
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 issues can be complicated due to the different perspectives and approaches taken by countries 
which are then transposed in their national law and policy stance on the issue. In some 
countries, the regulation of the internet and cyber-related transactions is significant for national 
security and these countries have legal mechanisms in place allowing extensive governmental 
intrusion into the sender and recipient details of every single transmission, and the contents of 
such transmissions. Other countries approach the regulation of the internet and internet-based 
transactions with caution, noting the requirement for balancing security concerns against 
certain constitutionally protected freedoms, and there embrace the preservation of privacy and 
data protection laws. 
 
Given the challenge of international cooperation in this space, a possible approach that 
could be adopted is a regional approach to regulating virtual currency transactions and 
exchanges. For instance, recently in South East Asia - Singapore, Japan and South Korea - 
regulators have engaged in partnerships on the cyber-security front, including through the 
signing of information sharing and collaborative agreements. It is believed that international 
cooperation will continue to deepen with the opening of the INTERPOL Global Complex for 
Innovation in Singapore in 2014.71 
 
Effective virtual currency regulation (both for convertible decentralised and centralised 
virtual currencies) will require more detailed cooperation arrangements with foreign regulators. 
RegTech, as such will play a key role here and its international standardisation will be needed. 
Suffice to mention that in some jurisdictions, virtual currency regulation takes on an extra-
territorial approach. In countries, such as the US or Canada, such regulations are expressed as 
having extraterritorial effect, however due to absence of an international regulatory approach 
to virtual currency exchanges, firms are subject to multiple layers of regulation with potentially 
 33 
 conflicting and irreconcilable rules at the same time. For instance, Canada’s recently released 
virtual currency regulations, issued by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
of Canada (“Fintrac”), are stated to have extraterritorial effect and captures foreign firms that 
either have a place of business in Canada, or are offering services to Canadians. Thus, a virtual 
currency firm or exchange operating in any other jurisdiction, may have to comply both with 
the regulation in their jurisdiction and regulations in jurisdictions whose regulation have extra-
territorial effect, such as Canada, to the extent that such firms has a Canadian office or markets 
to Canadian customers. In a case of conflict, the firm may have no choice but to comply with 
the stricter standard, even though its competitors may not be similarly constrained; worse still, 
in cases of more fundamental conflict, complying with either standard may put a firm in breach 
of the other standard it is subject to. This thus calls for coordinated international approach for 
the regulation of virtual currencies. 
 
A robust international regulatory regime should focus, as a matter of urgency, on the 
cross-border harmonisation of regulations of virtual currencies / virtual currency exchanges 
transactions, in order to minimise, amongst other things, terrorism financing through money 
laundered by the operation of these VC firms. An international regime can take on the US 
approach to regulating these entities through the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN). This approach could lead to civil monetary penalties against virtual currency 
exchangers, for violating regulatory standards, such as licensing and registration requirements, 
as seen in the US case of Ripple Labs Inc, cited above. 
 
Suffice to mention that the FATF Recommendations also offers suggestions as to areas 
where cross-border harmonisation of regulation of VC/VC exchanges can be concentrated. For 
instance, Recommendation 272 requires national cooperation and coordination with respect to 
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 AML/CFT policies. According to the FATF, countries may consider putting in place 
mechanisms, such as inter-agency working groups, to enable policy-makers, regulators, 
supervisors, the financial intelligence unit (FIU), and law enforcement authorities to cooperate 
with each other and any other relevant competent authorities to develop and implement 
effective policies, regulations and other measures to address VC ML/TF risks.73 
 
With specific reference to virtual currency exchangers – who are the nodes through 
which such transactions are linked to the fiat financial system – as they transfer value digitally, 
via the internet, and are not subject to territorial boundaries and generally offer VCPPS to 
persons in countries in which they are not physically present, it is very important that all home 
countries apply domestic licensing or registration requirements on such entities or institutions 
providing such services. As such, the need for proper oversight by the home jurisdiction and 
adequate cooperation and information exchange between competent authorities between 
jurisdictions where the entity provides services is of high importance.74  This of course, as 
considered earlier, is a problem given that some jurisdictions have quite weak financial 
regulatory regimes and countries are at different degrees of financial systems and financial 
regulatory developments. 
 
While there are gaps in regulating this sector and while nations have diverse financial 
regulatory strengths and robustness of law enforcement/criminal justice systems, terrorism 
financing through virtual currencies remains a real threat.  
 
The introduction of global RegTech standards, which is the fast pace direction which 
the FinTech industry is heading, would make significant contributions to the regulation of 
virtual currencies. Critical to these developments would be: countries’ acceptance of the 
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 regulation of this space; the speed to agree robust global standards and the extent of the global 
application /adoption of these RegTech standards and, in particular, within ‘high-risk’ states.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
While the growth of the Financial Technology (FinTech) industry world-wide signals huge 
opportunities for businesses and consumers, it also introduces a myriad of challenges to the 
global financial industry. The challenge considered in this article is the potential of virtual 
currencies, a key FinTech innovation, to be used to finance terrorism activities.  
 
This article has argued that, while financial regulatory regimes world-wide are at 
different stages of development and the robustness of law enforcement regimes worldwide 
vary, the threat of terrorism financing remains real - more so as terrorism financing is likely to 
shift to jurisdictions with weaker regimes. 
 
This calls for global action that, itself, is not without challenges due to the different 
approaches taken by countries in regulating internet/cyber-based transactions – the main 
channel for virtual currencies transactions. The development of Regulatory Technology 
(RegTech) to enable the regulation and monitoring of FinTech products and services, like 
virtual currencies, offers some solutions. Critical to its effectiveness in regulating virtual 
currency transactions are: the speed of the adoption of global RegTech standards for virtual 
currency transactions; the strength of such standards - since countries take different approaches 
to regulating internet-based transactions - and the national adoption of those standards, 
especially in ‘high-risk’ states with weak financial regulatory and law enforcement regimes. 
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